We study multistep Bayesian betting strategies in coin-tossing games in the framework of game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk (2001) . We show that by a countable mixture of these strategies, a gambler or an investor can exploit arbitrary patterns of deviations of nature's moves from independent Bernoulli trials. We then apply our scheme to asset trading games in continuous time and derive the exponential growth rate of the investor's capital when the variation exponent of the asset price path deviates from two.
Introduction
The field of game-theoretic probability and finance established by Shafer and Vovk [12] has been rapidly developing in many directions. The present authors have been contributing to this exciting new field by focusing mainly on explicit strategies of the gambler and the growth rate of his capital ( [14] , [15] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [13] , [5] , [16] ). Following the terminology of Shafer and Vovk [12] , we refer to the gambler as Skeptic or Investor (Section 4) and refer to nature as Reality or Market (Section 4).
In this paper we extend the results of [7] and [16] by considering multistep Bayesian strategies. In [7] we considered a class of Bayesian strategies for Skeptic in coin-tossing games, strategies that were based only on the past average of Reality's moves. We proved the important fact that if Skeptic uses a Bayesian strategy and Reality violates the strong law of large numbers (SLLN), then the exponential growth rate of the Skeptic's capital process is very accurately described in terms of the Kullback divergence between the average of Reality's moves when she violates SLLN and the average when she observes SLLN. Furthermore in [16] we applied Bayesian strategies for coin-tossing games to asset trading games in continuous time. If we discretize a continuous-time game by an equispaced grid in the state space (i.e. the vertical axis), then the continuous time game can be approximated by an embedded coin-tossing game. Thus the results of discrete time coin-tossing games can be applied to continuous-time games. In particular we gave a proof of " √ dt-effect", i.e., Investor can force Market to choose a price path with variation exponent equal to two, within an arbitrary small constant.
More generally, discretization of continuous-time game in [16] is based on the requirement that Investor choose a countable number of discrete stopping times against a continuous path chosen by Market. This approach allows us to formulate and study continuous-time games in game-theoretic probability within the conventional theory of analysis, whereas in the book by Shafer and Vovk continuous-time games were formulated as limits of discrete time games using nonstandard analysis. Vovk has taken up this formulation and is currently rapidly developing it in [17] , [18] , [19] . By these works of Vovk it has now become clear that many measure-theoretic results on continuous-time stochastic processes can be more directly derived in the framework of game-theoretic probability. It should be emphasized that the game-theoretic approach is advantageous because no probabilistic assumptions on the paths are imposed a priori. Instead, a stochastic behavior of Market results from the protocol of the game. This has a far-reaching conceptual implications for the emergence of probability.
In the coin-tossing games Reality may deviate from independent Bernoulli trials in a subtle way without violating the strong law of large numbers. For example, Reality could choose a deterministic sequence where heads and tails alternate. Then SLLN holds for this kind of paths and they can not be prevented by Bayesian strategies in [7] . We could use "contrarian" strategies ( [5] ) based on the past average of Reality's moves for preventing this kind of paths. However a more natural approach is to model autocorrelations between successive moves of Reality. Note that the deterministic sequence of alternating heads and tails can be regarded as a sequence with the first-order autocorrelation of −1. These considerations naturally lead to multistep Bayesian strategies of the present paper. Then by a countable mixture of these strategies Skeptic can detect and exploit arbitrary patterns of deviations from the sequence of independent Bernoulli trials.
Our results have close relations to the ones in many fields. Universal source coding has been extensively studied in information theory (e.g. Han and Kobayashi [4] ) and the equivalence of source coding and betting is discussed in Cover and Thomas [1] . Various notions of randomness have been studied from the viewpoint of Kolmogorov complexity (e.g. Li and Vitányi [10] , Lambalgen [9] ) and there exists an extensive literature on algorithmic theory of randomness. See two forthcoming books on algorithmic randomness by Downey and Hirschfeldt [2] and by Nies [11] . We discuss these relations in Section 5.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we set up notations for the coin-tossing game and give some preliminary results. In Section 3 we consider two types of Reality's moves which suggest deviations from independent Bernoulli trials. The first is a block type pattern and the second is a Markovian type pattern. We construct Skeptic's Bayesian strategies which can exploit these non-randomnesses. We show that it is asymptotically always advantageous to exploit higher order patterns in Reality's moves. In Section 4 we consider asset trading games in continuous time and investigate the consequences of high-frequency block type strategies and Markovian strategies. We derive the exponential growth rate of Investor's capital process when Market chooses a path with variation exponent not equal to two. Finally in Section 5 we discuss some aspects of our results and their implications for related fields.
Preliminaries on coin-tossing games and Bayesian strategies
In this section we summarize preliminary results on coin-tossing games and capital process of Bayesian strategies ( [12] , [7] ). We also discuss a one-to-one correspondence between the set of probability distributions on the set of Reality's paths and the set of Skeptic's strategies. Finally we note the convexity of the Kullback divergence with respect to its first argument. In this paper we consider the coin-tossing game in the following form. In the protocol the success probability 0 < ρ < 1 is given.
Coin-Tossing Game Protocol:
Reality announces x n ∈ {0, 1}.
In this case we say that Skeptic bets M 1 n on x n = 1 and M 0 n on x n = 0. Although (1) is a redundant expression, generalizations to multistep protocols in the next section can be more transparently understood in this form. A path ξ = x 1 x 2 . . . is an infinite sequence of Reality's moves and the sample space Ξ = {ξ} = {0, 1}
∞ is the set of paths. ξ n = x 1 . . . x n denotes the partial path of Reality's moves up to round n. Throughout this paper we use the notation
Skeptic's strategy P is a set of functions P : ξ n−1 → M n which determines Skeptic's move M n at round n based on Reality's moves up to the previous round ξ n−1 = x 1 . . . x n−1 . Given a strategy P
denotes Skeptic's capital process when he uses P, starting with the initial capital of K 0 = 1. Following the terminology in [17] we call P prudent if K P n (ξ) ≥ 0 for all ξ and n, i.e., Skeptic's capital is never negative irrespective of the moves of Reality. We also say that Skeptic observes his collateral duty if he uses a prudent strategy. In this paper we require that Skeptic's strategies are prudent.
We consider probability distributions on the set of paths Ξ = {0, 1} ∞ . In our framework a probability distribution Q on Ξ is just a collection of consistent discrete probability distributions Q = {Q n ; n ≥ 1}, where Q n is a discrete probability distribution on Ξ n = {0, 1} n satisfying the consistency condition
Note that we do not need measure-theoretic extension of Q to a probability measure on a σ-field of Ξ. Under the distribution Q, the conditional probability of x n = 1 given ξ n−1 = x 1 . . . x n−1 with Q n−1 (ξ n−1 ) > 0 is written as
If Q n−1 (ξ n−1 ) = 0, then p Q n is not defined. We call the probability distribution of i.i.d. Bernoulli trials with success probability ρ the risk neutral measure of the coin-tossing game.
Given a probability distribution Q, define a strategy P = P Q by
A motivation of this definition is given in Appendix. If we write
The capital process of P Q is explicitly written as follows ([7, Theorem 4.1]).
This is the likelihood ratio of Q to the risk neutral measure at the realized path ξ n up to round n. In Appendix, we establish a one-to-one correspondence between the set of probability distributions on Ξ and the set of prudent strategies. Therefore capital process of a prudent strategy can always be expressed as (6) .
In particular if we employ a beta-binomial distribution
where a, b > 0 are hyperparameters of the prior distribution, then by a simple application of Stirling's formula, the resulting capital process denoted by K 0 n behaves as
where
− q is the Kullback divergence between two scalar probabilities p and q. Hence ifx n deviates from ρ, then D(x n ρ) gives the average exponential growth rate of the capital process. We call D(x n ρ) the main growth rate (or simply the growth rate) of the log capital.
In the subsequent sections we often use the convexity of Kullback divergence for probability vectors with respect to its first argument. Let p = {p j } k j=1 and q = {q j } k j=1 be probability vectors and let
denote the Kullback divergence between p and q. Let p i = {p ij } k j=1 , i = 1, 2, be probability vectors and for 0 < λ < 1 letp = λp 1 + (1 − λ)p 2 = {p j } k j=1 . Then the following relation is easily obtained
The left-hand side can also be written as
3 Priors for higher order patterns and multistep strategies
As discussed in Section 1 there may be some deviating patterns from independent Bernoulli trials in the Reality's moves x 1 x 2 . . . , although the path ξ = x 1 x 2 . . . satisfies SLLN lim n→∞xn = ρ. The strategy considered in [7] is based only on s n and it can not exploit these patterns. Skeptic can increase his capital by strategies exploiting patterns not reflected inx n . In the following we investigate two types of such non-randomness or higher order patterns. The first is the block type pattern and the second is the Markovian type pattern. We give multistep Bayesian strategies which effectively exploit these patterns.
Block patterns
For clarity of presentation, we first consider sequence of pairs (i.e. blocks of length 2) and later generalize the results to blocks of arbitrary length. Consider the sequence of pairs (x 1 x 2 )(x 3 x 4 ) . . . (x 2n−1 x 2n ) of Reality's moves and denote the number of the pairs (11) , (10) where
We construct a strategy for which lim sup n K n = ∞ whenever lim sup n |m ij n /n − ρ ij | > 0 at least for one (i, j). For this purpose, at the (2n − 1)-th round (n = 1, 2, . . . ) Skeptic chooses four amounts M (11), (10), (01), (00), respectively. Then we have
and other z ij n , i, j = 0, 1, are defined similarly. Thus we define a derived capital process K * n = K 2n with the protocol
As a natural generalization of the beta-binomial distribution treated in [7] , let us take the Dirichlet-multinomial distribution as Q(ξ 2n ) = Q(z 1 . . . z n ). Then the corresponding strategy is given by (cf. (5) and (7))
where c ij 's are positive hyperparameters of the Dirichlet prior and i,j∈{0.1} c ij = c. The
for this strategy is given by
where in the products i, j range over {0, 1}. We evaluate the asymptotic behavior of this capital. Denote m ij n /n =p ij n , i, j = 0, 1. Then as in (8) we have
Hence for even n the original capital process K
Now if we neglect the pairwise block patterns and apply the strategy of [7] based on s n only, then corresponding capital process K 0 n behaves as (8) . We compare K P Q n and K 0 n . By (9) with λ = 1/2 we have log K
We see that K P Q n exploits the pairwise block type non-randomness more effectively than K 0 n by the amount half the Kullback divergence given in the right-hand side of (10) .
So far we have only considered even n. This is sufficient for analyzing the asymptotic behavior of K P Q n . For completeness we discuss K P Q n for odd n. We can decompose Skeptic's bet M 2n+1 is written as follows.
.
We can construct a similar strategy for the sequence of pairs (x 2 x 3 ) . . . (x 2n x 2n+1 ) and can also combine these two strategies by splitting the initial capital into two equal parts and applying the corresponding strategy for each of them. Let K B = K P Q denote the capital process considered so far and letK B denote the similar capital process based on (x 2 x 3 )(x 4 x 5 ) . . . . Then the capital process of the combined strategy is written as
. Hence lim sup n K n = ∞, if the relative frequency of consecutive pairs (x 2n−1 x 2n ), (x 2n x 2n+1 ), taking the value (ij) does not converge to {ρ ij /2} for some (ij).
We have discussed blocks of length two for notational simplicity. The above derivation can be extended to n blocks of consecutive k-tuples, and hereafter we outline the procedure. Let x k 1 , x k 2 , . . . , x k n be the first n blocks of k-tuple with
and let m ǫ k n , ǫ k = ǫ 1 . . . ǫ k , ǫ i = 1 or 0, denote the number of the consecutive k-tuple ǫ k among the first n blocks. Also denote
If the sequence is random, we will have lim n→∞ m
Thus the derived game K * n = K kn is defined with the protocol
, then the corresponding strategy is given by
where ∀c
, are the hyperparameters of the Dirichlet prior. The capital process for this strategy is
We evaluate the asymptotic behavior of this capital. Denote m
Hence in the context of the original game, for n which is a multiple of k, we have log K
Similar strategies can be constructed for the n blocks of the k-tuples with shift a
We next combine k kinds of these strategies by splitting the initial capital into k equal parts and applying the corresponding strategy for each of them. Let K n denote the resulting capital process. Then lim sup n K n = ∞, if for any ǫ k the relative frequency of any of
It is of interest to compare the growth rates of K P Q n for different block lengths k. Note that block pattern strategy of length k also depends on the shift a. If the empirical distribution of {ǫ k } is different for a, then the main growth rate of a block strategy depends also on a. For simplicity we mainly consider the case that the empirical distribution F n,a of {x
is the same for different shifts a, in the sense that the total variation distance between F n,a and F n,a ′ converges to 0 for all a = a ′ . We call this case "homogeneous with respect to the shifts". We show in Section 3.3 that the main growth rate of (11) is non-decreasing in k under the assumption of homogeneity with respect to the shifts.
Markovian patterns
We can construct another strategy which exploits non-randomness in the moves of Reality. Such a procedure can be given as
where M + n and M − n can have different values. This is a first-order Markovian strategy, which incorporates the information on the last move x n−1 of Reality. As in the previous subsection, for clarity of presentation we first consider the first-order Markovian strategy and then extend it to higher-order Markovian strategies.
Let q 1 n = s n and q 0 n = n − s n . We also denote the numbers of pairs (x i−1 x i ) = (11), (10), (01), (00), i = 2, . . . , n by q For i = 1, we let M
n for this strategy is given by
n +q 01
We evaluate the asymptotic behavior of this capital process. Write q 1 n /n =p n =x n , q (8) we have
Hence if either lim sup n |r 
Then by (9) with λ =p n we have
We again see that log K n exploits the first-order Markovian non-randomness more effectively than log K 0 n by the amount given above. The above first-order procedure can be extended to the k-th order procedure based on sequencex k n−1 = x n−k . . . x n−1 of length k preceding x n . We hereafter outline the procedure.
Let q ǫ k n denote the number of consecutive k-tuple ǫ k in ξ n = x 1 . . . x n . For (k + 1)-tuples ǫ k 1 = ǫ 1 . . . ǫ k 1 and ǫ k 0 = ǫ 1 , . . . , ǫ k 0 we similarly define q ǫ k 1 n and q ǫ k 0 n . We take the beta-binomial distribution for Q(x i |x
to round k is taken as the risk neutral measure.) The corresponding strategy is
The capital process K n = K P Q n for this strategy is written as
We evaluate the asymptotic behavior of this capital. Denotep (11), because the latter only looks at the relative frequency of ǫ k among non-overlapping blocks of length k. As n → ∞, we have
Hence if lim sup n |r ǫ k − ρ| > 0 for any ǫ k , then lim sup n K n = ∞. In the next section we show that the first term on the right-hand side of (14) is non-decreasing in k.
Relations between block strategies and Markovian strategies
In (10) and (13) we saw that the block strategy of length two and the first-order Markovian strategy have better main growth rates than the strategy based s n only. In this section we give results on the comparison of main growth rates for general k, which is the block size for block strategies and the order for Markovian strategies. For Markovian strategies we show that a larger k gives a better growth rate. Concerning block strategies we show that the same result holds under the assumption of homogeneity with respect to shifts and furthermore that Markovian strategy of order k − 1 gives a better growth rate than the block strategy of length k.
We first consider Markovian strategies. Let K M,k n denote the capital process of k-th order Markovian strategy. In (14) , for a given ǫ k−1 = ǫ 2 . . . ǫ k consider the sum of two terms involving 1ǫ k−1 = 1ǫ 2 . . . ǫ k and 0ǫ k−1 = 0ǫ 2 . . . ǫ k . We havê
where O(1/n) is due to the counting problem at the end of the sequence ξ n . Alsô
Then by (9)
Summing up over ǫ k−1 ∈ {0, 1} k−1 we have
Therefore the growth rate of the Markovian strategy of order k is larger than that of order k − 1 by the amount shown on the right-hand side. Next we consider block strategies. For j = 0, 1, definê
and under the the assumption of homogeneity with respect to shifts, the relative frequencyp ǫ k n of ǫ k is the same for different shifts a and this implies that p
By induction on k we obtain
n is the capital process of the strategy based on s n only. In (16) we saw that the growth rate of Markovian strategy is non-decreasing in k. It follows that under the assumption of homogeneity with respect to shifts the growth rate of the block strategy is also non-decreasing in k and furthermore the growth rate of the Markovian strategy of order k − 1 is better than that of the block strategy of length k.
We should note that if the homogeneity does not hold, then the growth rate of the block strategy of length k might be better than that of the Markovian strategy of order k − 1. If we divide the initial capital into k equal parts corresponding to each shift, then the combined capital process is the arithmetic average of the capital process for different shifts. The growth rate of the combined capital equals the maximum of capital processes for different shifts and the maximum might be better than that of the Markovian strategy or order k − 1. The question of homogeneity comes up again in consideration of the asset trading game in continuous time.
Universal Bayesian Skeptic by mixture of priors
When we incorporate the strategies developed in the previous subsections, we get a strategy which can exploit any block or Markovian patterns of any length deviating from independent Bernoulli trials.
Let P B,k be the Bayesian strategy which exploits the k-th order block patterns constructed in Section 3.1, and let P M,k be the Bayesian strategy which exploits the k-th order Markovian patterns constructed in Section 3.2. At first we divide the initial capital K 0 = 1 into equal two parts K 0B = 1/2 and K 0M = 1/2, and further divide K 0B = 1/2 into countably infinite accounts with positive initial capitals c B1 , c B2 , . . . , ∞ k=1 c Bk = 1/2, and also divide K 0M = 1/2 similarly as c M 1 , c M 2 , . . . , ∞ k=1 c M k = 1/2. We apply the strategy P B,k to the k-th account c Bk and apply the strategy P M,k to the k-th account c M k , respectively. The resulting "universal" strategy
can exploit any block or Markovian pattern of any length. We shall formulate and state this fact within the framework of measure-theoretic probability in order to clarify the connection to the universal source coding in information theory. For simplicity of statement we consider the coin-tossing game with ρ = 1/2 and use the base two logarithm. Let {p ǫ k } denote the k-dimensional probability distribution of a random vector (X 1 , . . . , X k ) ∈ {0, 1} k . Then
where H(X 1 , . . . , X k ) denotes the entropy of {p ǫ k }. For an infinite sequence X 1 , X 2 , . . . of stationary and ergodic 0-1 random variables, the entropy H(X ) = H(X 1 , X 2 , . . . ) is defined as H(X ) = lim k (1/k)H(X 1 , . . . , H k ). Under the assumption of stationarity and ergodicity, each k-dimensional empirical distribution converges to the probability distribution {p ǫ k } almost surely. Furthermore in the previous subsection we saw that larger block sizes achieve better growth rates. Therefore, arguing as in Chapter 13 of [1] we have the following proposition. 
Thus we can say that K P * n → ∞ achieves the optimal rate in the sense of universal source coding in information theory.
Application to asset trading games in continuous time
In this section we apply the results on the block strategy of length two and the first-order Markovian strategy of the previous section to an asset trading game in continuous time considered in [16] . It should be noted that our interest here is to derive explicit growth rates of our strategies applied to the asset trading game, rather than a rigorous treatment of forcing of the variation exponent of two. Therefore in our derivation we proceed with informal definitions and convenient regularity conditions. In Section 4.1 we summarize the setup of an asset trading game. In Section 4.2 we obtain growth rates of our strategies for the asset trading game when the variation exponent of the asset price path deviates from two.
Preliminaries on asset trading games in continuous time
Here we summarize preliminary facts on the asset trading game as formulated in [16] . Our framework in [16] is now much generalized in the recent papers of Vovk ([17] , [18] , [19] ).
Suppose that there is a financial asset which is traded in continuous time. Let S(t) denote the price of the unit amount of the asset at time t. We assume that S(t) is positive and a continuous function of t. The price path S(·) is chosen by a player "Market", which is the same as Reality in the coin-tossing game. "Investor" enters the market at time t = t 0 = 0 with the initial capital of K(0) = 1. He decides discrete time points 0 = t 0 < t 1 < t 2 < · · · to trade the financial asset. The trading time t i and the amount M i of the asset Investor holds for the interval [t i , t i+1 ) can depend on the path of S(t) up to time t i .
The basic fact on the behavior of S(t) is the " √ dt-effect" ( [20] , [16] ), which asserts that infinitesimal increments |dS(t)| of the price path have to be of the order O( √ dt), in the sense that otherwise Investor can make arbitrarily large profit without risking bankruptcy. When |dS(t)| = O((dt) H ), then H ∈ (0, 1] is called the Hölder exponent or the Hurst index of S(t), and 1/H is called the variation exponent. Thus the game-theoretic statement of √ dt-effect is that Investor can force the variation exponent of two. We consider "limit order" strategy of Investor. Let δ > 0 be a constant. Investor determines the trading times t 1 , t 2 , . . . as follows. After t i is determined, let t i+1 be the first time after t i when either
happens. This procedure leads to a discrete time coin-tossing game embedded into the asset trading game as follows. Let
Also writeK n = K(t n+1 ). Clearly x n can be thought as "heads" or "tails" chosen by Market after the time t i . More formally we define the following protocol of an embedded discrete time coin-tossing game.
Embedded Discrete Time Coin-Tossing Game Protocol:
Market announces x n ∈ {0, 1}.
This embedded discrete time game allows us to apply results on coin-tossing games to the asset trading game in continuous time. The amount M i of the asset held during [t i , t i+1 ) is determined by our strategies in Section 3. From now on we fix the time interval [0, T ] of the asset trading game. Then the total number rounds n = n(δ) played in the embedded coin-tossing game is finite. For a given path, n(δ) is increased by letting δ ↓ 0 in (18) . n(δ) diverges to infinity as δ ↓ 0, unless S(t) is constant on [0, T ]. We call a strategy with small δ a high-frequency strategy. In [16] we applied high-frequency Bayesian strategy of [7] to the embedded discrete time game and proved that Investor can force the variation exponent of two, within an arbitrary small constant.
However the Bayesian strategy of [7] is based only on s n and does not take the higher order patterns of the increments of S(t) into account. In the previous section we saw that multistep Bayesian strategies can effectively exploit higher order patterns when Reality's moves are not random. Therefore it is of interest to investigate how fast Investor can increase his capital by a high-frequency multistep Bayesian strategy, if the variation exponent of S(t) deviates from two.
Growth rates of block strategy of length two and first-order
Markov strategy for asset trading game
In this section we derive growth rates of high-frequency block strategy of length two and first-order Markov strategy in the embedded coin-tossing game. Our results are stated in two propositions at the end of this section. Write η = log(1 + δ). Then η ↓ 0 is equivalent to δ ↓ 0. We decrease η to zero as
The advantage of taking this sequence of η k is that the equi-spaced grids for log S(t) are completely nested in k and we can establish some important relations between the empirical distributions of block patterns for different k (see Lemma 4.1 below). We call the embedded coin-tossing game with η k the k-th embedded coin-tossing game. Let n(η k ) denote the total number of rounds of the k-th embedded coin-tossing game. For notational convenience we sometimes write n or n k instead of n(η k ). As in Section 3.1, let m ij n k /2 , i, j = 0, 1, denote the number of pairs (ij) among (x 1 x 2 )(x 3 x 4 ) . . . in the k-th embedded coin-tossing game. For the shift of one, letm ij n k /2 denote the number of pairs (ij) among (x 2 x 3 )(x 4 x 5 ) . . . in the k-th embedded coin-tossing game. For these counts of pairs, it is more precise to write m We now give a preliminary consideration on the behavior of counts n(η k ), q
At this point it is helpful to consider properties of fractional Brownian motion (Chapter 4 of [3] ). Let {B H (t)} denote the fractional Brownian motion of Hurst index H. B H (t) corresponds to log S(t) in the asset trading game. B H (t) is a typical stochastic process with |dB H (t)| = O((dt) H ). {B H (t)} is self-similar, i.e., for every a > 0 the distribution of {B H (at)} coincides with that of {a H B H (t)}. This implies that making the grid finer as η k → η k /2 is equivalent (in distribution) to increasing T as T → 2 1/H T . This suggests that when Market chooses a path S(t) with a fixed exponent H, then
Furthermore {B H (t)} has stationary increments, i.e., the distribution of the increments of {B H (t)} are invariant with respect to arbitrary time shift. This corresponds to our assumption of homogeneity with respect to the shifts in Section 3.3. Under the homogeneity assumption we expect 2m
Also note the following trivial combinatorial relations for any n:
From game-theoretic viewpoint Investor can force H = 1/2. If Market chooses a path with H = 1/2, then the notion of forcing can not be applied and there is no guarantee that (19) and (20) hold. However even for H = 1/2 we use (19) , (20) as convenient regularity conditions for evaluating the growth rates of our strategies in view of the properties of the fractional Brownian motion. In Proposition 4.1 and Proposition 4.2 below we obtain the growth rate of the first-order Markovian strategy and block strategy of length two under these conditions. In these propositions the approximate equalities in (19) and (20) are understood in the sense that the ratios two sides converge to 1. Now we state the following crucial combinatorial fact.
Lemma 4.1. For each path S(t) and for each k
Proof. Consider two nested equi-spaced grids with intervals η k−1 and η k = η k−1 /2. For the grid with the interval η k−1 , consider a step, where the price is going upward from t i to t i+1 i.e. log S(t i+1 ) = log S(t i ) + η k−1 in (18) . It is obvious that this upward step corresponds exactly to two consecutive upward steps for the the grid with the interval η k . Therefore m
. By counting downward steps, we similarly obtain m 00
We now derive the growth rate of the first-order Markovian strategy. Define
Also note that 1/2 = lim δ→0 ρ δ . Furthermore by Lemma 4.1, under (19)
denote the capital of the first-order Markovian strategy at the end of the k-th embedded coin-tossing game. By (12) we obtain the following proposition. 
We now consider the block strategy of length two. Let K B n k denote the capital of block strategy at the end of the k-th embedded coin-tossing game. By (17) we know that log K 
Therefore the growth rate of the block strategy is half of rate of the Markovian strategy. K M,0 n k is the capital process of the strategy based only on the past average of Reality's moves considered in [16] , whose growth rate is zero. It is of interest to note that despite this zero growth rate, the strategy in [16] was sufficient to force the variation exponent of two of the Market's path. This suggests that looking for a simple strategy for forcing certain event and looking for a more aggressive strategy with a better growth rate need different considerations.
Discussions
In this paper we studied multistep Bayesian strategies for coin-tossing games. Our general conclusion was that asymptotically we obtain better growth rates by incorporating larger block sizes for block strategies or longer orders for Markovian strategies. However this conclusion has to be taken with the following cautions. When the main growth term expressed in terms of the Kullback divergence is close to zero, we have to compare this to the term of order O(log n). Generally the term of order O(log n) can be understood as a penalty term for larger models, i.e., for using strategies incorporating larger blocks. Therefore if the coin-tossing game is played only a finite number of rounds, or Reality does not deviate too much from the independent Bernoulli trials, then it might be advantageous to use shorter block sizes. This is essentially the same tradeoff as in statistical model selection based on various information criteria. It is of great interest to consider selecting among strategies or dynamically adjusting weights for them.
For convenience we made the assumption of homogeneity for block strategies in Section 3.3 and in Section 4. We initially thought that homogeneity can be "forced" on Reality by appropriate strategies of Skeptic. However, when Reality deviates from independent Bernoulli trials, the game-theoretic notion of forcing can not be applied. Intuitively it seems that Skeptic can further exploit patterns in Reality's moves when the homogeneity with respect to shifts does not hold. However at present it seems difficult to formulate results in this direction.
In Section 3.4 we considered an infinite countable mixture of block strategies and Markovian strategies. Using this countable mixture, Skeptic can asymptotically exploit any deviation of Reality's moves from independent Bernoulli trials. We pointed out that the idea of the universal source coding in information theory is similar. Our result is also very closely connected to results in algorithmic theory of randomness. We can think of each component strategy as a test of randomness of Reality's moves. In algorithmic randomness there are strong computability restrictions on the allowed sample spaces. In the game-theoretic approach we do not have to worry about computability and by appropriate discretization it is now possible to discuss the randomness of continuous paths.
In Section 4.2 we only considered block strategies of length two and first-order Markovian strategies in the embedded coin-tossing game. We could obtain the explicit descriptions for the growth rates in Proposition 4.1 and Proposition 4.2 because of the combinatorial fact of Lemma 4.1. It is of interest to investigate growth rates of higher-order Markovian strategies in the asset trading game.
For measure-theoretic stochastic processes, the regularity conditions assumed in Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 are basically law of large numbers, and we expect that they hold for fractional Brownian motions. However the trading times in (18) are stopping times and the fractional Brownian motion for H = 1/2 is not a Markov process. Therefore it is not easy to prove that the regularity conditions hold for fractional Brownian motions.
A Equivalence of Bayesian strategy and prudent strategy in coin-tossing games
Here we establish a one-to-one correspondence between Skeptic's prudent strategy and a probability distribution on the set of paths Ξ in the coin-tossing game. For one direction suppose that Skeptic models Reality's moves by a probability distribution Q. Write α n = M n /K n−1 . Given K n−1 assume that Skeptic tries to maximize the conditional expected value of log K n . It is equivalent to maximizing p n log(1 + α n (1 − ρ)) + (1 − p n ) log(1 − α n ρ)
with respect to α n , where p n = p Q n is given in (3). The maximizing value of α n is uniquely given as α n = p n − ρ ρ(1 − ρ) .
With this α n ,
Note that K n = 0 if either p n = 0 and x n = 1 or p n = 1 and x n = 0. In this case Skeptic can not play any more. For other cases he can keep playing the game. It should be noted that this is consistent with the definition of conditional probability in (3), namely, Skeptic can continue the game if and only if (3) is defined. We have shown that a probability distribution Q leads to the strategy given in (4).
For another direction let P be a prudent strategy of Skeptic. Starting with the initial capital of K 0 = 1, define Q 1 (1) = ρ + M 1 ρ(1 − ρ) = ρ(1 + M 1 (1 − ρ)), Q 1 (0) = 1 − ρ − M 1 ρ(1 − ρ) = (1 − ρ)(1 − M 1 ρ).
Then Q 1 (0) and Q 1 (1) are non-negative and 1 = Q 1 (0)+Q 1 (1). For the case K n−1 (ξ n−1 ) > 0 recursively define Q n (ξ n−1 1) = ρQ n−1 (ξ n−1 ) 1 + M n (ξ n−1 ) K n−1 (ξ n−1 )
(1 − ρ) , Q n (ξ n−1 0) = (1 − ρ)Q n−1 (ξ n−1 ) 1 − M n (ξ n−1 ) K n−1 (ξ n−1 ) ρ .
These are non-negative and satisfy the consistency condition (2) . If K n−1 (ξ n−1 ) = 0, then define 0 = Q n (ξ n−1 1) = Q n (ξ n−1 0), which is also consistent. By this procedure a Skeptic's prudent strategy leads to a probability distribution P → Q.
By construction it is obvious that this map is the inverse map to (4) and therefore there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the set of probability distributions and the set of Skeptic's strategies satisfying the collateral duty.
Finally we state the following Bayesian optimality result, which follows easily from the maximization in (22) Proposition A.1. Let Q be a probability distribution on Ξ and let P be the strategy corresponding to Q. For any other strategyP
